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In this paper, we provide selective evidence on the impact of natural and manmade disasters on 
household welfare.  First, we consider ex ante risk management and ex post risk-coping 
behaviors separately, showing evidence from the Asian economic crisis, earthquakes, and 
tsunami disasters.  Second, we differentiate idiosyncratic risks which can be diversified away 
through mutual insurance from non-diversifiable aggregate risks which characterize a disaster.  
We also discuss the difficulties of designing index-type insurance against natural disasters, which 
are often rare, unforeseen events.  Then, we investigate the role of self-insurance against 
large-scale disasters under which formal or informal mutual insurance mechanisms are largely 
ineffective.  Credit accessibility is identified as one of the key factors facilitating risk-coping 
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1. Introduction 
 
In developed as well as developing countries, people are at a wide variety of risks to 
their livelihood.  Accidents, sickness, or sudden death can disable the head of a household or 
even an entire family.  Agricultural production involves a variety of price and yield risks which 
appear to be prevalent especially for small-scale, poor farmers in the semi-arid tropical areas in 
developing countries.  Even for households in urban, industrial or commercial sectors, income 
fluctuates over time due to contractual and physical risks in the handling of products, 
intermediate goods and employees in LDCs.  Macroeconomic instability or recessions, which 
tend to generate harsh inflation/deflation and widespread unemployment, can also significantly 
reduce the real value of household resources.  However, natural disasters can generate the most 
serious consequences ever known.  Recently, a number of natural disasters hit both developed 
and developing countries alike.  We still remember vividly how a huge number of lives were 
lost in the Indian Ocean tsunami, Pakistan earthquake, Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) earthquake, 
and Hurricane Katrina.  In addition to disasters caused by natural events, man-made disasters 
such as economic crisis, terrorism, and wars also create serious damage. 
In this paper, we will provide selective evidence on the impact of natural and manmade 
disasters on household welfare.  Three aspects differentiate this paper from earlier related 
studies.  First, while there has been a remarkable progress in the theoretical and empirical 
literature on risk and household behavior [Fafchamps (2003); Dercon ed. (2005)], shocks 
generated by a disaster, which potentially gives a clean experimental situation, have rarely been 
investigated or utilized.  Secondly, unlike previous studies on household behavior against 
general idiosyncratic shocks, we explore quantitatively the role of savings, borrowing, and other   3 
risk-coping devices against disasters as a covariate shock.  Finally, by using preliminary results 
based on a unique data set collected in the earthquake- and Tsunami-affected areas, we discuss 
the role of public policy to facilitate households’ risk-coping behavior against disasters.    
In general, a disaster is defined as an unforeseen event that causes great damage, 
destruction and human suffering, which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to 
national or international level for external assistance (The Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters, 2006).
1 Disasters in this definition include warfare, civil strife, 
economic crisis such as hyperinflation and financial crisis, hazardous material or transportation 
incident (such as a chemical spill), explosion, nuclear incident, building collapse, blizzard, 
hurricane, drought, epidemic and pandemic, earthquake, fire, flood, or volcanic eruption.   
  Augmenting the classification system of UNISDR (2005), these disasters can be 
classified into three broad categories, natural disasters, technological disasters, and manmade 
disasters.  Firstly, the natural disasters can be divided into three subgroups: 1) 
hydro-meteorological disasters including floods, storms, and droughts; 2) geophysical disasters 
including earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions; 3) biological disasters such as epidemics 
and insect infestations.  Secondly, the technological disasters are mainly composed of two 
subgroups: 1) industrial accidents such as chemical spills, collapses of industrial infrastructures, 
fires, and radiation; 2) transport accidents by air, rail, road or water means of transport.  Finally, 
manmade disasters are also composed of two subcategories; 1) economic crises including growth 
collapse, hyperinflation, and financial, and/or currency crisis; 2) violence such as terrorism, civil 
strife, riots, and war.  In this paper, we confine ourselves to analyze natural and manmade 
disasters.   
                                                 
1  The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (2006) recorded a disaster which fulfills at 
least one of the following criteria: 10 or more people reported killed; 100 people reported affected; 
declaration of a state of emergency; and call for international assistance.     4 
  Figure 1 shows the number of natural disasters registered in EM-DAT: the 
OFDA/CREAD International Disaster Database for 1900-2004.  We can see the apparent 
increasing trend of natural disasters, especially of hydro-meteorological disasters.  A closer look 
at the data for 1995-2004 by type of triggering hazards reveals that floods are the most 
commonly occurring natural disaster, followed by droughts and related disasters, epidemics, and 
earthquakes and tsunamis (Table 1).  Table 1 also reveals that epidemics are serious in Africa, 
while Asia was hit by a large number of earthquakes and tsunamis.    
  As to manmade disasters, the number of complex economic crisis also seems to be 
increasing.  A seminal work by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) reveals that the number of 
currency crises per year did not increase much during the 1980’s and 1990’s, while the number 
of banking crises and simultaneous banking and currency crises, i.e., twin crisis, increased 
sharply in the 1980’s and 1990’s (Table 2).   
  The number of people affected and killed by natural disasters has also been increasing in 
the last 30 years.  Yet, the estimated damage from natural disasters does not necessarily increase 
with that of the numbers of disasters and victims (Figure 2).  The amount of damage seems to 
depend on the location of the disaster (Figure 2).  According to Table 3, the level of damages 
from natural disasters is much higher in developed countries than that in developing countries, 
while the impact of disasters to a national economy may be higher in developing countries.  The 
Great-Hanshin (Kobe) earthquake and the hurricane Katrina recorded the two largest economic 
damages in history [Table 3, Horwich (2000)].  These changes in natural and manmade 
disasters suggest the increasing importance of research on disasters.   
In response to the wide variety of shocks caused by natural and manmade disasters, 
households have developed formal and informal mechanisms.  We classify such insurance   5 
mechanisms by two dimensions.  First, we consider ex ante risk management and ex post 
risk-coping behaviors separately.  Secondly, we divide insurance mechanisms into mutual and 
self-insurance through market and non-market mechanisms [Hayashi et al. (1996)].  The rest of 
this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we discuss risk management and coping 
behaviors.  Some evidence from the Asian economic crisis, earthquakes, and tsunami is shown.  
In Section 3, we differentiate idiosyncratic risks which can be diversified away through mutual 
insurance from non-diversifiable aggregate risks which characterize a disaster.   Then, we 
investigate the role of self-insurance against large-scale disasters under which formal or informal 
mutual insurance mechanisms are weak.  In the final Section, we will discuss public policy 
issues of disasters, which will be followed by the concluding remarks.   
 
2. Risk Management and Coping against Disasters 
 
While people in developing countries, especially the poor, face many risks in their day 
to day lives, maintaining a stable consumption level above subsistence is essential for 
maintaining households’ standard of living over time.  Poverty occurs when a household’s 
per-capita consumption level falls below a properly-defined poverty line.  Hence, the central 
behavioral problem of LDC households becomes a reconciliation of income fluctuation and 
consumption smoothing.  This problem can be theoretically captured as the problem of 
intertemporal consumption smoothing under a stochastic income process.  Following Morduch 
(1995), we can capture the negative welfare costs of risks by calculating how much money 
households would be willing to pay to completely eliminate income variability.  Mathematically,   6 
such an amount of money is represented by m which satisfies the following relationship:
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where u(·) is a well-behaved utility function, y ~is a stochastic income and y is its mean value.  
Taking a first-order Taylor expansion of the left-hand-side around m=0 and a second-order Taylor 
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Equation (2) indicates that approximately, the fraction of average income that a household would 
be willing to give up can be calculated as half of the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
multiplied by the square of the coefficient of variation of income.  Table 4 shows the estimated 
welfare costs of risks in India and Pakistan.  These results indicate that the welfare cost of risks 
is at least 10% and can be 30-50% of household income.  Since natural and manmade disasters 
generate larger income volatilities than these income fluctuations, the welfare costs estimated 
here may be regarded as lower-bound estimates of the negative welfare impacts of natural or 
manmade disasters.   
Based on the framework of the Life-Cycle Permanent Income Hypothesis (LC-PIH), the 
recent micro-development literature examines the role of risks in determining the nature of 
                                                 
2 The variable m represents a standard risk premium.   
3 This is the so-called Arrow=Pratt risk premium.   7 
poverty.  These studies address the effectiveness of formal and informal risk management or 
coping mechanisms of households [Alderman and Paxson (1992); Besley (1995); Deaton (1997); 
Dercon ed. (2005); Fafchamps (2003); Morduch (1995); Townsend (1994, 1995); Udry (1994)].   
 
2.1 Risk Management and Risk Coping Strategies 
 
Risk management strategies can be defined as activities for mitigating risk and reducing 
income instability before the resolution of uncertainties in order to smooth income (Walker and 
Jodha, 1986; Alderman and Paxson, 1992).  Farmers have traditionally managed agricultural 
production risks by crop diversification, inter-cropping, flexible production investments, the use 
of low-risk technologies, and special contracts such as sharecropping.  Even in commercial and 
industrial sectors, ethnicity or kinship-based long-term business relationships are often formed in 
order to alleviate various contractual risks beforehand.  It has been argued that ex ante 
investments in mitigating the risk of natural disasters are very cost effective in providing ex post 
compensations for losses from disasters.  However, it is often difficult by nature to elaborate 
proper risk management strategies against natural disasters because they are typically rare, 
events, and sometimes even worse, they are unforeseen.   
Accordingly, even if households adopted a variety of risk management strategies, a 
disaster can happen unexpectedly, causing serious negative impacts on household welfare.  For 
example, crops and livestock may be destroyed by a natural disaster on an unprecedented scale.  
Sudden accidents, sickness, or death can disable the household head or family unexpectedly.  
Against unexpected natural disasters, ex post risk-coping will be indispensable where risk-coping 
strategies are defined as ex post strategies to reduce consumption fluctuations, provided income   8 
fluctuations due to these ex-post risks [Alderman and Paxson (1992)].  In general, the existing 
literature identified the following different ways of risk-coping mechanisms.  First, households 
can reduce consumption expenditure with maintaining total calorie intakes.  Second, 
households can use credit to smooth consumption by reallocating future resources to today’s 
consumption.  Third, households can accumulate financial and physical assets as a 
precautionary device against unexpected income shortfalls.  Finally, locating household 
members and/or receiving remittances in emergency is a form of risk-coping. 
 
2.2 The Asian Crisis in Late 1990’s 
 
First, a household can maintain total nutritional intake, while it reduces food purchases and other 
expenditures.  This is accomplished by changing the quality and composition of food 
expenditures or by reducing non-food expenditures, such as those for luxuries.  As revealed in 
recent studies on the aftermath of the currency crisis in Indonesia, Korea, Thailand and Mexico, 
consumption reallocation is indeed an important coping strategy (Frankenberg, Smith, and 
Thomas, 2003; Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle, 1999; Kang and Sawada, 2003, McKenzie, 
2003, 2004; Strauss et al., 2004; Townsend, 1999).  According to Table 5, Indonesian 
households seem to have weathered the crisis by cutting back meat consumption, medical and 
education expenses, and leisure expenditure by approximately 40-60% while maintaining stable 
food consumption.  In Korea under the financial crisis, a decrease in leisure expenditure would 
be an important coping behavior as well (Table 6).  Yet, unlike Indonesian households, Korean 
households did not cut back medical and education expenses significantly.  This difference 
between Indonesia and Korea may cause a different long-term impact of the manmade disaster   9 
because human capital accumulation might be disrupted seriously in Indonesia.    
Second, facing a disaster, households can use credit to s mooth consumption by 
reallocating future resources to current consumption.  The lack of consumption insurance can 
be compensated for by having access to a credit market (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989; Besley, 
1995; Glewwe and Hall, 1998).  However, poor households usually only have limited access to 
credit markets and are constrained from borrowing for a variety of reasons such as the lack of 
collateral assets.  In any case, the existence of credit constraints has important negative impacts 
on the risk-coping ability of poor households.  According to Table 6, average amount of Korean 
household debt increased by 28% during the financial crisis, but the nature of the financial crisis 
worked negatively on the role of credit as a risk coping behavior [Goh, Kang, and Sawada 
(2005)].  Kang and Sawada (2003) revealed that between 1997 and 1998, the likelihood of 
facing credit constraints increased significantly.  The expected welfare loss from binding credit 
constraints is estimated to increase by 45% during the crisis, suggesting the seriousness of the 
credit crunch at the household level.   
Third, households can accumulate financial and physical assets as a precautionary 
device against unexpected income shortfalls caused by a disaster.  This is also called 
“self-insurance.”  Forms of precautionary savings in developing countries include grain storage 
[Townsend (1995); Park (2006)], cash holdings [Townsend (1995)], liquidation of bullocks 
[Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)], and sales of goats and sheep [Fafchamps, Czukas, and Udry 
(1997)].  However, according to Table 6, during the Korean crisis, sales of assets did not 
increase significantly, and assets declined by a mere 2%, implying that such sales did not serve 
as an important coping device.  This may indicate that households were reluctant to sell their 
assets to cope with the negative shock since land and stock prices declined sharply [Goh, Kang,   10 
and Sawada (2005)].   
On the other hand, private and public transfers rose by 8 and 11 percent, respectively.  
Yet, transfers constituted only 4% of total income, and merely 22% of total households received 
transfers.  Particularly, the amount of private transfers was still not sufficient to support 
households living in urban areas [Kang and Sawada (2003)].  Public transfers consisted 
predominantly of pensions, which take 82% of public transfers on average, since most of the 
social safety net programs were not yet in place during the initial phase of the crisis.   
 
2.3 Hanshin Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake 
 
In the early hours of January 17, 1995, the Hanshin (Kobe) area in Japan was hit by a 
major earthquake.  The area is densely populated comprising more than 4 million people and is 
a part of the second largest industrial cluster in Japan.  The earthquake induced a human loss of 
more than 6,400, a housing property loss greater than USD 60 billion, and a capital stock loss of 
more than USD 100 billion, making it the largest economic damage recorded in history [Figure 2, 
Table 3, Horwich (2000); Sawada and Shimizutani (2005)].  Given the fact that only 3% of the 
property in Hyogo Prefecture, where Kobe is located, was covered by earthquake insurance, it is 
reasonable to assume that the earthquake was entirely unexpected in this area.   
Sawada and Shimizutani (2005) utilize an unique household-level data which was 
collected with the earthquake affected households  in October 1996, 22 months after the 
earthquake.  With this data set, Sawada and Shimizutani (2005)  employ binary-dependent 
variables of the three risk-coping strategies, i.e., borrowing, receiving public and private 
transfers, and dissaving.  According to Table 7, among the respondents who faced a negative   11 
impact due to the earthquake, more than half utilized their dissavings.  Borrowing and receiving 
transfers were also considered as significant risk-coping strategies for approximately 10% and 
12% of valid responses, respectively.   
The survey was also carried out in order to record the details of the damage caused to 
the respondents by the earthquake, such as damages to the house, household assets, and the 
health of the family members.
4  In Table 7, it should be noted that 85.6% and 86.7% of the 
respondents suffered from damages to their house and household assets, respectively.  These 
figures are indicative of the seriousness of the e conomic loss caused by the unexpected 
earthquake. 
Sawada and Shimizutani (2005) investigated further the relationship between the 
damages and coping strategies.  They found that transfers may be particularly ineffective as 
insurance against  losses for co-resident households.  Households borrow extensively against 
housing damages, whereas dissavings are utilized for smaller asset damages, implying a 
hierarchy of risk-coping measures, from dissaving to borrowing.   
The Kobe earthquake caused historically-large damages to the economy and the people.  
In order to identify the peculiarity of the large-scale disaster, we can compare it with a smaller 
natural disaster.  Ichimura, Sawada, and Shimizutani (2006) collected data of about 650 
victims of the Chuetsu earthquake which occurred in October 2004.  The total 
economic-losses caused by the Chuetsu earthquake were around one fifth of that caused by the 
Kobe earthquake (Table 3).  According to the data set, about 32.3% managed to cope with the 
damages by dissavings and about 9% utilized borrowings from banks, relatives, friends, and 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that, shortly after the earthquake, the local governments conducted metrical surveys 
and issued formal certificates for housing damages using which the households could later obtain 
government compensations.  Therefore, we believe that the information obtained on housing damages is 
fairly objective and accurate.     12 
government schemes.  More importantly, receiving public and private transfers were 
considered as a significant risk-coping strategy for approximately 47% of respondents.  This 
high proportion reveals that government support and an informal social safety net can be quite 
effective if the scale of the disaster is not too large.   
 
2.4 Indian Tsunami Disaster 
 
In the morning of December 26, 2004, a Tsunami caused by the Sumatra earthquake hit 
the eastern and southern coastal areas of India (Figure 3).  Estimated damages were highest in 
Tamil Nadu State (815.0 million USD) and the fishery sector was affected most (Table 8).  The 
number of deaths caused by tsunami was also the highest in Tamil Nadu State, especially in the 
Nagapattinum district, where 6,065 people perished (Table 9).  The majority of the victims were 
women and children.   
  In January-April 2006, we conducted a survey of 400 households from eight villages in 
the Nagapattinum district that were affected by the Tsunami ( Sawada, 2006).  A stratified 
random sampling scheme was adopted to obtain representative information of the damaged 
villages.  Table 10 summarizes the damages caused by tsunami and households risk-coping 
means adopted against the damages.  As for the damages, the majority of households lost 
productive assets such as boats and faced income losses.  It is notable that receiving aid from 
government, relatives and neighbors, self-help groups, and NGOs were important means of 
coping for more than 90% of households, followed by borrowing for around 41% of households 
(Table 10).   
   13 
3. The Role of Market and Non-Market Institutions 
 
  The next issue we will discuss in this paper is the role of market and non-market 
institutions against disasters.  For this, it is useful to classify different types of risks by the level 
at which they occur.  Idiosyncratic shocks affect specific individuals while aggregate shocks 
affect groups of households, an entire community and region, or a country as a whole.  This 
distinction is important because the geographic level at which risks arise determines the 
effectiveness of market and non-market institutions against risk.  On one hand, a risk that 
affects a specific individual can be traded with other people in the same insurance network 
through informal mutual insurance as well as a well-functioning formal insurance or credit 
market.  On the other hand, a risk that affects an entire region cannot be insured within the 
region and necessitates a formal market in which region-specific risks are diversified away 
across regions.  In fact, the extent to which a risk is idiosyncratic or correlated depends 
considerably on the underlying causes.  Table 11 presents a useful typology of risks constructed 
by the World Bank (2001).   
Households have developed formal and informal risk coping mechanisms against these 
wide variety of shocks [Cochrane (1991); Mace (1991); Townsend (1994); Besley (1995); 
Fafchamps (2003); Dercon ed. (2005)].  Largely, we classify such insurance opportunities as 
mutual and self-insurance opportunities.  Mutual insurance provides consumption insurance 
opportunities across households through a variety of either market or non-market mechanisms 
such as formal insurance markets, credit market transactions that reallocate future resources to 
current consumption [Eswaran and Kotwal (1989)] and informal reciprocal transfers and credit   14 
among relatives, friends, and neighbors.
5  The government can also complement the household 
risk coping behavior by direct public transfers, such as unemployment insurance.  Regarding 
self-insurance, in the event of unexpected negative shocks, households can utilize their own 
financial and physical assets that have been accumulated beforehand [Caroll and Samwick 
(1998); Zhou (2003)].   
 
3.1 Full Insurance through Market or Non-Market Mechanisms 
 
In order to investigate the implications of the complete mutual insurance, we can solve a 
benevolent social planner’s problem by maximizing the weighted sum of people’s lifetime 
utilities given intertemporal resource constraints [Mace (1991)].
6  A solution to this problem is 
that under full insurance, idiosyncratic household income changes should be absorbed by all 
other members in the same insurance network.  As a result, after controlling for aggregate 
shocks, idiosyncratic income shocks should not affect consumption when risk sharing is efficient.  
The theoretical implications for the existence of complete risk-sharing arrangements within an 
insurance network are widely tested in the literature [Townsend (1994, 1995), and Udry (1994)].   
The theoretical model employed here is based on Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), Udry 
(1994) and Townsend (1993)’s full insurance model in a pure exchange economy.  In the model, 
an economy with an insurance network, which can be a village or a district, is composed of N 
infinitely-lived households, each facing serially independent income draws.  The Pareto-optimal 
consumption allocation problem of a hypothetical social planner becomes the Negishi-weighted 
                                                 
5 The self-enforcement mechanisms of this self-interested mutual insurance scheme could be sustained as 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria in a repeated game [Coate and Ravallion (1993); Kocherlakota (1996)]. 
6 This condition is also derived from solving the household optimization problem with complete 
contingent market.   15 
utility maximization subject to the economy’s goods market equilibrium condition: 
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where r is a household’s subjective discount rate, p denotes the probability of realization of a 
state of nature, s, and e represents consumable initial endowment of each household.  As is well 
known, a full insurance contract or social planner solves the above maximization problem for 
some Pareto-Negishi weight  l.  Several assumptions, however, are required.  Firstly, all 
market participants can perfectly observe uncertainty realizations.  In other words, there is no 
private information and thus information structure is symmetric.  Secondly, the contingent 
securities span the state space and thus markets are complete.  Thirdly, the probability 
distribution of state realization,  p(•), is identical across households; i.e., households have 
identical beliefs about future.  Finally, households have identical utility functions with identical 
time discount rates. 
  From the FOC of this problem, we have an optimal condition for intertemporal 
allocation of consumption for the jth and ith consumers:. 
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This equation indicates that this hypothetical social planner will allocate endowments so as to 
equalize households’ weighted marginal utility (Figure 4).  Therefore, the full consumption   16 
insurance hypothesis implies that a household’s consumption allocation should be independent of 
idiosyncratic variables.  Under the CARA utility, i.e., u(c)=-(1/s)exp(-sc), we have 
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Equation (5) indicates that, under full insurance, idiosyncratic household income changes should 
be absorbed by all other members in the same insurance network.  As a result, idiosyncratic 
income shocks should not affect consumption.   
Townsend (1994) and Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) test this full insurance model 
using data from the three poor and high risk Indian ICRISAT villages.  Although the model is 
rejected statistically, household consumption is found to move with village average consumption, 
which indicates that household consumption is only partially influenced by idiosyncratic shocks.  
From information collected by field research in northern Thai villages, Townsend (1995) 
concluded that risk-response variations across households suggest that Pareto improvements are 
possible in a full-information risk-sharing or an information-constrained version of the same 
model. 
Hence, the very strict full-insurance hypothesis does seem to be rejected statistically in 
most data sets, especially for the poorest farmers.  Yet, the empirical consensus tells that in 
general, the degree of missing markets is much smaller than many had assumed, and many 
better-off households seem to face almost complete insurance and credit markets against 
idiosyncratic shocks [Morduch (1995), Townsend (1995)].   17 
However, natural disasters are often rare, unexpected events by which people become 
burdened by abrupt damages.  Hence, it is even harder to design mutual insurance for natural 
disasters.  In fact, Sawada and Shimizutani (2006) investigate whether people were insured 
against unexpected losses caused by the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) earthquake in 1995.  
They found that the full consumption insurance hypothesis is rejected overwhelmingly, 
suggesting the ineffectiveness of formal/informal insurance mechanisms against the earthquake.   
 
Market versus Non-Market Insurance 
 
These tests of the complete consumption insurance hypothesis can examine the validity 
of a wide variety of formal and informal insurance mechanisms such as borrowing and receiving 
private and/or public transfers as a whole [Mace (1991)].  Yet, it is not easy to disaggregate the 
effectiveness of formal and informal insurance mechanisms.  In fact, there is very little research 
on formal insurance consumption [Outreville (1990); Galabova and Lester (2001); and Enz 
(2000)].  In order to capture the relative importance of market (formal) and non-market 
(informal) mechanisms, we can utilize cross-country data on life and non-life insurance 
penetration, the Sigma database, complied by Swiss Re.  This data set is supposed to capture 
formal insurance traded in markets.   
According to Figure 5, there is a positive relationship between volume of life and 
non-life premiums per capita and GDP per capita.  Moreover, it is evident that the fitted slope 
will be larger than unity.  This suggests that formal insurance appears to be a luxury especially 
in low and middle-income countries and that people’s preferences are characterized by increasing 
risk aversion.  Yet, provided that the poor should have higher potential demand for insurance   18 
because their marginal utility loss from a downside risk is higher than the rich, more informal 
insurance devices should be demanded in developing countries.  For example, 
community-based burial societies without legal status can be found all over the world against 
mortality risks [Morduch (2004)].  Moreover, Galabova and Lester (2001) found that 
micro-data from several countries support the notion of insurance as a necessary item.  The 
macro-micro paradox in demand for insurance, especially whether luxury formal insurance arises 
from demand or supply side, should be examined carefully in future studies [Nakata and Sawada 
(2006)]. 
 
Idiosyncratic versus Aggregate Shocks 
 
  Having discussed the role of mutual insurance to diversify idiosyncratic risks, we should 
note that full insurance schemes against aggregate shocks such as region-wide weather shocks, 
droughts, and natural or manmade disasters cannot be constructed within a village because these 
sources of risk are village, region, or even nation specific.  Yet, even across a village or region, 
households can build informal insurance networks that are not necessarily complete.  For 
example, Lucas and Stark (1985)’s evidence from Botswana shows that remittances from urban 
family members are particularly large when the drought is severe, which implies that there is a 
concern for preserving assets; households buy insurance by placing members in markets whose 
outcomes are not highly positively correlated.  By analyzing Indian data, Rosenzweig and Stark 
(1989) found that marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the 
variability of household food consumption and that farm households afflicted with more variable 
profits tend to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration; the marriage of daughters aims   19 
at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing. 
  Yet, a formal analysis of the validity of inter-village full risk sharing using IFPRI’s rural 
Pakistan data over three years reveals that district or nation-wide full risk sharing hypotheses are 
rejected strongly [Kurosaki and Sawada (1999)].  Their result suggests that a larger scale formal 
or informal insurance network is far  from complete.  As we can see from Table 11, natural 
disasters and manmade disasters are characterized by correlated nature of their shocks, affecting 
many people at the same time.  This implies that it may be difficult for existing social safety 




  As an effective insurance instrument against covariate shocks, index insurance contracts 
have been attracting wide attention [Hazell (2003); Morduch (2004); Lilleor, Gine, Townsend, 
Vickery (2005); Skees, Varangis, Larson and Siegel (2006)]. Index insurance contracts are 
written against specific events such as drought or flood defined and recorded at a regional level.  
As such, index insurance involves a number of positive aspects; they can cover the aggregate 
events; they are affordable and accessible even to the poor; they are easy to implement and 
privately managed; and they are free from moral hazard, adverse selection, and high transaction 
costs that have plagued traditional agricultural insurance contracts such as crop insurance 
schemes.  The World Bank and other institutions have been piloting weather-based index 
insurance contracts in Morocco, Mongolia, Peru, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Romania, and Tunisia.   
Since natural disasters are typically an aggregate event, index insurance is thought to be   20 
an appropriate instrument to combat them.  Yet, there are three major constraints to design 
index type insurance against natural disasters.  First, natural disasters are often characterized by 
a rare event which makes it difficult to design actuarially fair insurance.  Since obtaining 
historical data on natural disasters pattern is hard, it is almost impossible to set appropriate 
premiums for insurance [Morduch (2004)].   
Secondly, related to the first issue, even if appropriate premiums are set, the poor who 
potentially should demand insurance against natural disasters may find it difficult to recognize 
the value of index type insurance against natural disasters.  This may be an inevitable 
consequence because natural disasters are often characterized by unforeseen contingencies by 
nature and because the poor often are often myopic with high time discount rates [Pender (1996)].  
Moreover, the existence of the “basis risk” with which an individual could incur damage but 
cannot be compensated enough, will also deter demand for index insurance.  This problem has 
been identified as an inevitable drawback of index insurance because index contracts essentially 
tradeoff basis risk for transaction costs [Morduch (2004); Hazell (2003)].   
Finally, since natural disasters are highly covariate risks which often cannot be 
diversified within a country.  Accordingly, the insurers have a potential need to secure their 
financial position by utilizing international reinsurance markets.  However, it is known that 
reinsurance markets and trades of catastrophe (CAT) bonds are still thin with limited capacity.  
Also, as an overall effectiveness of mutual insurance across national borders, recent studies show 
that the extent of international risk-sharing remains surprisingly small [ Obstfed and Rogoff 
(2001); Lewis (1996)].
7  However, using data on hurricane exposure, Yang (2006) found that 
                                                 
7 Another approach to secure insurers is that the government provide reinsurances.  This means that the 
aggregate shocks are diversified intertemporally, rather than spatially.  An example of this kind of 
reinsurance policy is the Japanese earthquake insurance in which the government provides a reinsurance 
scheme.     21 
the poor’s hurricane exposure leads to substantial increase in migrants’ remittances, so that total 
financial inflows from all sources in the three years following hurricane exposure amount to 
roughly three-fourths of estimated damages.  This suggests that aggregated shock arising from 




As we have seen, efficient risk sharing are likely to be absent especially for natural 
disasters as a rare, covariate event.  However, even for such risks, households are able to insure 
themselves against unexpected shocks by using self-insurance measures.  For example, Shoji 
(2006) examines the effective coping strategy against the huge historical flood in Bangladesh in 
1998, finding that under severe aggregate shocks, a group of people surrendered livestock assets 
even when quasi-credit was available only for idiosyncratic shocks.   
Following Zeldes (1989) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, Chapter 13), we derive a 
self-insurance model by assuming a household chooses a path to maximize the conditional 
expectation of discounted lifetime utility subject to a non-negativity constraint for assets and 
usual intertemporal budget constraints.  As a solution to this household problem, we obtain an 
augmented consumption Euler equation with the possibility of a liquidity constraint [Zeldes 
(1989)]: 
  it it t it
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where u (cit) is a utility function of the i-th household’s consumption, c, at time t, r is an 
exogenous interest rate, and  d  is a household’s subjective discount factor.  The variable m   22 
represents the Lagrange multiplier associated with liquidity constraints, indicating negative 
welfare effects generated by binding liquidity constraints.
8  Note that the self-insurance model 
represented by equation (6) involves weaker restrictions than the full risk sharing model [Saito 
(1999), p. 53].  From the intertemporal budget constraints, we obtain: yt
PRT + yt
PUT + yt
N – nt = st 
+ ct, where yt
PRT , yt
PUT , yt
N , nt, and st are private transfer income, public transfer income, 
non-transfer income, a negative shock to assets, and net savings, respectively.  Combining this 
intertemporal budget constraint and Equation (6), if the utility function is supposed to take the 
form of a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) function, then we have the following optimal 
self-insurance equation [Flavin (1999); Kochar (2003); Sawada and Shimizutani (2005)]: 
 





























,  (7) 
 
where b and d are borrowings and dissavings, respectively.  The last two terms on the 
right-hand side represent the effects of liquidity constraints and mean zero independent 
expectation error.  Equation (7) formally shows that there are four possible risk coping 
strategies, namely, borrowing additional amounts, receiving additional private transfer income, 
receiving additional public transfer income, and increased dissaving, against realized negative 
shocks, whose absolute values are represented by –?y
N
t + ? nt.  Equation (7) indicates that when 
a household is under a borrowing constraint, i.e., when µ is positive, the sum of the left-hand 
variables become smaller, suggesting that the sensitivity of different coping strategies against the 
same shock is weakened.  In this case, the household is forced to reduce its consumption level.   
                                                 
8 Since the household is constrained from further borrowing but not from further saving, m has a positive 
sign.   23 
By analyzing a 1998 survey of areas affected by Hurricane Mitch, Morduch (2004) 
found that for 21% of households, the main response to the hurricane was not to use savings, nor 
to borrow money; the main response was a drastic reduction in consumption.  This suggests that 
these households are constrained from borrowing against the shocks.  By investigating how 
victims of the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) earthquake in 1995 coped with their unexpected 
losses, Sawada and Shimizutani (2005) found that households without borrowing constraints can 
borrow and/or dissave to respond to damages caused by the earthquake, while those under a 
constraint are unable to either borrow or dissave against the losses.  However, private transfers 
are used for both types of households, depending on the magnitude of the damages. 
  These findings suggest that credit market accessibility seriously affects the effectiveness 
of self-insurance possibilities.  As we have seen in Table 6, facing lower accessibility of credit 
market due to the credit crunch during the financial crisis, Korean households did not liquidate 
assets significantly.  The effectiveness of risk coping strategies against natural and manmade 




3. Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks 
 
Our selective evidence confirms a serious lack of insurance markets for damages arising 
from natural and manmade disasters.  Without effective ex ante measures, the actual economic 
losses caused by a disaster can be enormous.  For example, the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) 
earthquake proved to be extremely large for the government to support effectively.  In fact, after   24 
the Kobe earthquake, the central and local governments provided the largest financial support in 
the history of Japan to reconstruct the affected areas and to facilitate economic recovery of the 
victims.  Despite the extensive support provided by the government, direct transfers to victims 
who lost their houses were merely USD 1,000-1,500 per household.   
In the process of preparing well-designed social safety nets against future natural 
disasters, there are three policy implications based on our analyses.  Firstly, in its attempt to 
provide ex post public support in the event of a natural disaster, the government may create a 
moral hazard problem by encouraging people to expose themselves to greater risks than required 
[Horwich (2000)].  Theoretically, index type insurance should be free from moral hazard 
problems, but as we have discussed, such an insurance contract would be difficult to design and 
sell in the case of rare, unexpected events.  Since our empirical results from the Korean 
financial crisis, the Hanshin-Awaji and Chuetsu earthquakes, and the Tsunami in India indicate 
that credit played an important role as a coping device and often the poor are excluded from 
credit transactions, providing subsidized loans, rather than direct transfers, to victims can be a 
good example of facilitating ex post risk-coping behavior; such interventions are less likely to 
create serious moral hazard problems.   
Secondly, having discussed the difficulty of designing index insurance, it would be 
imperative to design  ex ante risk-management policies against the disasters if at all possible.  
For example, development of markets for earthquake insurance would lead to the efficient 
pricing of insurance premiums and efficient land market prices reflective of the level of risk 
[Saito (2002)].  This development would generate proper incentives to invest in mitigations 
such as investments in earthquake-proof constructions against future earthquakes.  These ex 
ante measures would significantly reduce the overall social loss caused by the earthquake.    25 
Issues such as these will be important research topics in the future.   
Third, under the first “emergency rescue” phase of the recovery actions against a 
disaster, matching of emergency demands and massive proliferations of aid supply under 
imperfect information and uncertainties will be a major problem which should be solved properly.  
This phase is plagued by standard failures of traditional targeting programs.  The first problem 
can be called a problem of “targeting failure” in which wrong people are targeted (inclusion 
error) or right targets are excluded (exclusion error).   
Finally and more importantly, even if the government can identify the proper target 
group without problems, the stakeholders of public aid or subsidies might act inappropriately ex 
post.  Considering the lack of income information and the moral hazard problems of the 
means-test targeting, benefit eligibility in developing countries tends to be conditioned on 
personal or household characteristics or Akerlof’s (1975) “ tags” that are thought to be 
manipulation-free [Conning and Kavene (2002)].  Tags may be based on employment status, 
age, gender, number of dependents, location, and ethnicity.  In the case of disaster relief, 
damage status can be used to tag households.  Yet, tagging may not be entirely free from moral 
hazard problems.  Even under “tagged” targeting interventions, which are thought to be better 
than the means-test targeting, there are perverse incentives for people to change their 
characteristics in order to gain eligibility.   
In the tsunami affected areas of India,  a new phenomenon of “tsunami marriages” 
emerged from the government’s well-intended policy.  After the tsunami, the government 
announced its financial assistance policy to the survivors, who had planned their marriages 
before the tsunami.  This policy induced a spate of “unplanned” marriages.  Moreover, 
promises of providing a permanent home to newlyweds also induced unnecessary or even   26 
harmful marriages.  According to our data, attendance to wedding ceremonies per family in 
October 2005 has almost doubled from 1.11 times per month in November 2004 to 2.05 times 
per month in November 2005.  There is also evidence that these marriages involve very young 
women.  Moreover, this perverse moral hazard problem may even perpetuate a vicious cycle of 
dependency on the government’s financial aid.   
Tsunami marriages are an example of the difficulties of public or non-public 
interventions for victims of disasters.  As a future task, researchers should investigate the 
effectiveness and efficiency of matching supply and demand of emergency aid by gathering and 
analyzing data from areas after disasters.  As a potential scheme, researchers can explore how 
the government can make use of the role of community to design community-based aid 
allocation schemes through which imperfect information and pervasive incentive problems of the 
traditional programs are effectively mitigated [Bardhan (2002)].   
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Figure 1 
Number of Natural Disasters, 1900-2004 
 
Source: Disaster statistics, Occurrence: trends-century 
<http://www.unisdr.org/disaster-statistics/occurrence-trends-century.htm>, EM-DAT : The OFDA/CRED 




Annual reported economic damages from natural disasters: 1975-2005 
 
 
Source: 2005 Disasters in numbers, International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, United Nations 
 





Figure 4   
The Full Insurance Model 
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Figure 5 
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Source: Penn World Tables Version 6.1, and Sigma, Swiss Re. 
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Table 1 
Number of Natural Disasters by Type of Triggering Hazards: 
Regional Distribution 1995-2004 
 
  Hydrometerorological disasters 
 
Geological disasters  Biological disasters 














Epidemics  Insect 
Infestations 
Africa  277  70  123  11  0  0  18  4  346  14 
America  269  298  205  43  1  1  51  23  48  2 
Asia  444  326  229  97  16  6  193  13  154  3 
Europe  180  86  156  7  10  0  28  2  37  1 
Oceania  35  68  37  8  0  0  9  6  10  3 
World  1205  848  750  166  27  7  299  48  595  23 





Frequency of Economic Crises Over Time 
 
  1970-79 
 
1980-1995 
Type of crisis 
 
Total  Average per year  Total  Average per year 
Balance-of-payments  26  2.6  50  3.13 
Twin  1  0.10  18  1.13 
Single  25  2.50  32  2.00 
Banking 
 
3  0.30  23  1.44 
Source: Table 1 of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
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Loss as percentage of 
GDP 
 








































Hurricane Mitch in Ecuador (1998) 
 
2.9
i  14.6i 






























Great Kanto Earthquake (1923) 
 
32.6
g   




a: “Program-Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment”; b: BAPPENAS and the International Donor Community 
(2005), “Indonesia: Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment: The December 26, 2004 Natural Disaster”; c: World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank, and UN System (2005), “Tsunami: Impact and Recovery”; d: Asian Development 
Bank, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and World Bank (2005), “Sri Lanka 2005 Post-Tsunami Recovery 
Program-Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment”; e: the authors’ calculation based on World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators; f: Niigata Prefecture, Japan; g: the authors’ estimates using information from the Cabinet 
Office and the Ministry of Finance of the Government of Japan; h: the authors’ calculation based on the information 
from Risk Management Solutions (RMS); i: Table 1 in Freeman, Keen, and Mani (2003); j:  United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. 
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Table 4   
Quantifying the Seriousness of Risks 
 





















4)  15.35-34.24 
1) Table 5-3, 5-4, and 6-3 of Kurosaki (1998); 2) Morduch (1990); 3) Fafchamps (2003), p.184; 4) Table 10.6 of 




Changes in per capital consumption in Indonesia 
( unit: 1000Rupiah, per month value at Dec 1997 price)  
 
  1997 
( Rp)  
1998 




Urban households       
  Per capita consumption  319  184  -42 
  Staple  41.4  37.9  -8 
  Meat  40.5  19.1  -53 
  Medical  5.5  2.7  -50 
  Education  15.7  8.3  -47 
  Leisure  8.2  3.8  -54 
       
Rural households       
  Per capita consumption  194  128  -34 
  Staple  59.3  50.4  -15 
  Meat  24.2  12.5  -48 
  Medical  2.3  0.9  -61 
  Education  4.6  2.3  -50 






  Source: Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle (1999) 
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Table 6 
Changes in per capital consumption in Korea 
( unit: 10,000 Won, per year value at 1995 price)  
 
  Aug 1996 
– July 97 
Aug 1997 











     










Expenditures for luxuries (cultural  activities, 






       
Income, Asses, and Debts 
 
     















Sales of assets (land, real estate, securities, and 






Total assets (savings account, shares, bonds, 














       
Source: Kang and Sawada (2003) 
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Table 7 
Damages and Coping-Strategies under the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake 





Dummy = 1 if reallocations of the constituents of the consumption were the most 
significant means of coping 
0.250 
 
Dummy = 1 if dissaving was the most significant means of coping  0.537 
Dummy = 1 if borrowing was the most significant means of coping  0.096 







Dummy = 1 if major housing damage was caused by the earthquake  0.174 
Dummy = 1 if moderate housing damage was caused by the earthquake  0.251 
Dummy = 1 if minor housing damage was caused by the earthquake  0.431 
Dummy = 1 if major household asset damage was caused by the earthquake  0.094 
Dummy = 1 if minor household asset damage was caused by the earthquake  0.773 








Table 8   
Damages caused by Tsunami in India 
Location  AP  Kerala  Pondich
erry 
TN  Total 
Districts Affected*  7  7  2  13  29 
Villages Affected*  301  187  33  376  935 
Dead*  106  170  428  7921  10380 
Injured*  N.K.  1616  N.K.  3324  5602 
Missing*  7  2  81  N.K.  12098 
Displaced*  N.K.  157417  30000  433048  631994 
Damage to Fishery Assets**    51.8  50.8  94.7  801.3  998.6 
Fishery Income Loss**  88.6  117.8  107.3  2105.3  2469.8 
Damage to Agriculture and 
Livestock Asset** 
1.99  19.59  3.70  40.53  65.81 
Agriculture and Livestock 
Income Loss** 
1.80  8.70  4.59  82.27  97.36 
Damaged Houses*** 
 
481  13,042  10,061  130,000  153,585 
* As of 5 Jan, UNICEF “Tsunami Relief Operation: Tamil Nadu” (Internal Information) 
** In crore Rs., Asian Development Bank, United Nations, and World Bank (2005) “India Post Tsunami 
Recovery Program Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment” 
*** Asian Development Bank, United Nations, and World Bank (2005) “India Post Tsunami Recovery Program 
Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment”  40 
Table 9   
Damages caused by Tsunami in Tamil Nadu State by District 
 







Chennai  73000  17805  206  55 
Cuddalore  99704  15200  617  198 
Kancheepuram  100000  7043  129  14 
Kanyakumari  187650  31175  828  727 
Nagapattinum  196184  39941  6065  1922 
Pudukkottai  66350  1  15  0 
Ramanathapuram  0  6  6  0 
Thanjavur  29278  3  33  482 
Thiruvallur  15600  4143  29  0 
Thiruvarur  0  0  28  0 
Tirunelveli  27948  630  4  4 
Tuticorin  110610  735  3  0 
Villupuram 
 
78240  9500  47  30 
Total 
 
984564  126182  8010  3432 




Damages and Coping-Strategies under the Tsunami in India 
Variable Description  Mean 
 
Coping Variables during the relief phase (Dec 26, 
2004-April 30, 2005) 
 
 
Dummy = 1 if sales of assets was the most important means of   
         coping 
0.088 
Dummy = 1 if borrowing was the important means of coping 
 
0.405 
Dummy = 1 if receiving transfers was the important means of   






Dummy = 1 if lost house  0.04 
Dummy = 1 if house seriously damaged  0.16 
Dummy = 1 if lost utensils  0.15 
Dummy = 1 if lost productive assets such as boats  0.785 
Dummy = 1 if lost job  0.24 
Dummy = 1 if income declined  0.603 
Dummy = 1 if lost members  0.053 
Dummy = 1 if members got injured or sick 
 
0.013 
Source: Sawada (2006)   41 
 
Table 11 
A Typology of Risks 
 
Source: Table 8.1., World Bank (2001), World Development Report 2000/2001, Attacking Poverty, World Bank.   
 
 